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1. Introduction 
1. The leaders of the Pacific Forum have articulated a vision (‘the vision’ 
henceforth) for the region as one of: 
 
“peace, harmony, security, and economic prosperity, so that all of its people can lead 
free and worthwhile lives” whilst the region is respected for “the quality of its 
governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of 
democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights.” Pacific Island 
Forum Leaders Vision: Auckland Declaration, 2004
 
2. The Economic Ministers endorsed this vision, recognizing that: “sustainable 
development predicated on economic growth” is crucial to the realisation of this 
vision (FEMM Action Plan, 2004).  How urgent is the growth imperative?  What 
success, if any, has the Forum Economic Ministers Meetings (FEMMs) had in its first 
decade of existence in raising growth?1  What lessons, if any, are there from the past 
for future policy choices?  These are formidable and long-standing challenges; here I 
attempt to sketch out some of the answers to these questions. 
 
3. On the first question, there is a strong consensus within the leadership and the 
technocrats responsible for economic management that sustained growth in income 
(that is, prosperity) is essential for the realisation of the vision of lasting ‘peace and 
harmony’.  There is, moreover, an agreement amongst policymakers that the private 
sector will be the source of faster growth in all of the Forum Island Countries (FICs 
henceforth) and that the role of the public sector would largely be confined to 
providing the preconditions, principally in the form of regulations, for growth of 
private enterprise.  Furthermore, the necessary preconditions for raising investment 
will be the outcome of deliberate interventions on the part of economic managers.  
FEMM could have a pivotal role in this endeavour.   
 
4. Why the focus on growth?  The development community has reached a 
consensus on poverty reduction as the primary goal for development.  The Ministers 
reaffirmed this commitment in 2003 by noting that poverty reduction “should be the 
backdrop to all the issues discussed during Forum Economic Ministers Meetings” 
(FEMM Action Plan, 2003; paragraph 5).  Substantial reductions in poverty have been 
achieved in countries that have experienced sustained and thus sustainable rates of 
growth of income for extended periods of time.  China and India demonstrate that 
rapid and sustained growth of income leads to significant reductions in poverty while 
sub-Saharan Africa shows that growth declines lead to increased poverty 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2006; Chen and Ravallion, 2004).  There is 
considerable evidence of rising poverty in a number of the FICs; reversing this 
necessitates increases in the rate of growth of income and thus the growth imperative. 
 
5. This paper presents the following four key messages.  First, poor governance has 
been the primary reason for the poor economic performance of the FICs.  
Furthermore, past attempts at improving governance failed because it, in the main, 
addressed improving supply of rather than the demand for better governance.  Second, 
FEMM and the Forum leaders, collectively, can work together to provide regional 
                                                 
1 While Forum Leaders have been meeting annually since 1971, FEMM started in 1997 with its first 
meeting held in Cairns on 11 July. 
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public goods, including security and good governance. Third, economic growth can 
be promoted through increasing mobility: that is, facilitating mobility of people to 
jobs, jobs to people, and, idle-resources into productive use.  Policy has a role in the 
above through improving access to credit, basic education, primary healthcare, and 
transportation and communications services.  Finally, the isolated communities within 
the FICs can boost their opportunities for growth by integrating more deeply with the 
national, regional, and global economies.  Some lessons on what to do and those to 
avoid are drawn from past experimentation with polices targeted at raising growth. 
 
6. In drawing lessons from the past, a number of pleasant and the ‘not-so-pleasant’ 
country experiences have been highlighted.  The list is far from complete.  The aim of 
this exercise has been to draw policy lessons on what to do and those to avoid.  Any 
omissions and overt criticisms of economic management in any particular country are 
unintended and unfortunate. 
 
7. The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 provides a succinct 
survey of the poor growth record of the FICs and presents the case for raising rates of 
economic growth.  Section 3 discusses lessons from growth strategies used in the past, 
both within the FICs and abroad.  Section 4 highlights the challenges and 
opportunities for growth for the FICs over the next decade.  Conclusions and sum-up 
bring the paper to a close. 
 
2. The growth record and the growth imperative 
Economic performance 
8. There is considerable heterogeneity in economic performance across the 
individual FICs.  Table 1 provides data on land area, total population, average per 
capita income, aid receipts on a per capita basis, and life expectancy for three groups 
of nations: the FICs; Australia and New Zealand (ANZ henceforth); and, three island 
economies, namely, Maldives, Malta, and Mauritius (the 3Ms henceforth).  As shown 
in the table, there is far greater diversity on all the above-listed indicators within the 
FICs than across the three country groupings2.  Drawing generalisations for the FICs 
as a group, therefore, is problematic.   
 
9. In terms of per-capita income, the most widely used measure of economic 
wellbeing, Cook Islands ranks the highest with a purchasing-power-parity (PPP)-
adjusted (per capita) income, as of 2004, of US$6,092.  Solomon Islands and Tuvalu 
rank particularly low on this measure.  In terms of levels of per capita GDP, the FICs 
as a group have per capita incomes well below those of ANZ.  With the exception of 
Papua New Guinea, which has a land mass and population that is greater than that of 
New Zealand, the above comparison could be unfair given the considerable 
differences in size and endowments between ANZ on the one hand and the FICs on 
the other.   
 
10. Benchmarking performance of individual FICs is extremely difficult.  Here three 
island economies, those of, Malta, Maldives, and Mauritius, are used as the preferred 
                                                 
2 Data for several indicators for the FICs are either unavailable or of poor quality.  Data from the one 
consistent source, namely, the World Development Indicators (WDI) has been used wherever possible.  
The World Fact Book has been used to fill data gaps left by WDI.  Assuming that the errors are 
consistent over time for a given country, at a minimum these figures reflect broad, within-country 
trends.  However, cross-country comparisons are far more problematic.   
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benchmarks and for the following reasons.  First, the three are small island economies 
that have done exceptionally well in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction 
despite their handicaps of size and isolation.  Second, there are strong parallels 
between Mauritius and Fiji, and Maldives and Marshall Islands; these are elaborated 
upon later in the text.  Third, Malta is chosen because it is an island nation scarce in 
natural resources; limestone is its main natural resource.  Malta imports nearly 80 
percent of its food needs, draws some half of its drinking water from desalination 
plants, and is dependent on imports of fossil fuel for its energy needs.  It has however 
been successful in using its people as the main resource for development.  Growth in 
manufacturing and tourism on the back of private sector investments has enabled this 
small isolated island economy to reach high income status. The FICs, and particularly 
those without abundant natural resources, can use Malta for comparative purposes.   
 
11. FIC economies on the whole have performed poorly relative to their potential.  
Two pairs of country comparisons are used to support this claim.  Mauritius and Fiji 
have a number of similarities including their common colonial heritage, close to 
identical structure of production, and parallel dependence on access to preferential 
markets for their sugar and garment exports.  Both are island economies isolated from 
their major markets, both have a heavy dependence on tourism, and both face the 
prospects of loss of significant export revenues as world trade for sugar and garments 
is liberalised.  Mauritius gained its independence in 1968 and Fiji did the same two 
years later, and from the same colonial power; thus the two have very similar 
institutions.  Fiji, however, has the advantage of having a land area that is some nine 
times larger and a population that is some 32 percent smaller than that of Mauritius.  
Population density in Fiji, consequently, is nearly one-fifth the corresponding figure 
for Mauritius.  Fiji also had a 19 percent head start in terms of per capita GDP in 
1980.  If Fiji and Mauritius were two horses at the gates on the tracks in 1980, most 
punters would have placed their money on Fiji’s success over the subsequent two 
decades.  This, with the benefit of hindsight, would have been a mistake.  By 2004, 
Mauritius had a per capita GDP nearly double that of Fiji (see Figure 1).  As 
discussed later, the quality of governance seems to be the key difference between the 
two.3   
 
12. Like Fiji and Mauritius, Maldives and Marshall Islands (the latter being the 4th 
‘M’ but with the difference of being a FIC and with a lot poorer economic record) 
have many similarities; both being atoll states heavily dependent on tourism and 
located some distance away from their major tourist markets.  Marshall Islands, 
however, has the advantage of being in a Compact of Free Association with the 
United States of America.  Compact Funds and associated grants account for more 
than two-thirds of total government revenues.  The Compact also allows for 
unfettered access to the Marshallese to the US labour market.4  Despite these 
advantages, per capita income in Marshall Islands as of 2004 was less than one-half 
that of Maldives.   
 
                                                 
3 But this then begs the question of the reason for the poorer governance in Fiji.  My own research on 
the deep determinants of growth uses the Fiji and Mauritius comparison extensively.  Land tenure 
arrangements seem to be one reason for the weaker governance in Fiji compared to that of Mauritius 
(Chand, 1996). 
4 The FICs as a group receive high levels of aid on a per capita basis (see data in Table 1). 
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13. Generalisations drawn from cross country comparisons are fraught with problems 
but the pair wise comparisons made above are indicative of the poor performance of 
the FICs vis-à-vis their potential.  Comparing Nauru in 1970 to now reveals a similar 
conclusion.  Furthermore, Nauru and Tuvalu, two similarly sized economies have had 
very different experiences in managing their savings. While Tuvalu and Kiribati have 
been successful in growing their Trust Funds, Nauru has nearly depleted the same.  
Governance is the critical difference; FICs rich in natural resources have had a 
tendency towards poorer governance.   
 
Some of the factors impinging on past economic performance 
 
14. Disasters have led to growth collapses.  Some of the FICs have been badly 
affected by disasters, some natural, others man-made.5  These disasters in the form of 
cyclones, coups, civil strife, droughts, earthquakes, and tsunamis have had a 
devastating impact on their economies.  Comparing coups and cyclones in Fiji, I have 
come to the conclusion that the former has been far more devastating; coups, much 
like civil strife, create distrust between communities and thus taxes entrepreneurial 
activity, the effects of which lingers for decades.  The decade long conflict in 
Bougainville and the 4-year conflict in the Solomon Islands reaffirm these 
conclusions. Policy has a pivotal role in averting conflicts and in building resilience to 
natural disasters.  A number of the FICs, however, have failed to avert conflicts.  
Success with the above, therefore, is a major challenge in preventing economic 
collapse and spikes in poverty.6   
 
15. Policies to raise the rate of growth in a regionally accommodative labour market 
have had some success within the FICs.  Cook Islands and Samoa have witnessed 
recent surges in the rate of growth of their GDP following major economic reforms.  
Accesses to foreign labour markets in the absence of the policy shifts were 
insufficient to induce growth in per capita income.  Table 2 shows that aggregate 
GDP between 1999 and 2004 in Cook Islands grew by an annual average rate of 5.71 
percent while the corresponding figure for Samoa was 3.16 percent.  Per capita GDP 
in Cook Islands and Samoa grew by 4.74 and 3.39 percent, respectively; the 
comparatively high rates of growth of per capita income in these two countries were 
due to a combination of access to foreign labour markets, thus the low rates of growth 
of their population, and policies conducive to growth.  Kiribati, in contrast and 
without the same access to foreign country labour markets, experienced growth in 
aggregate GDP for the same period of 3.03 percent but with the population growing at 
2.3 percent, per capita GDP grew by less than one percent per annum.7   
 
16. Even the ‘high performers’ such as Cook Islands and Samoa have to improve on 
past performance if the vision of ‘peace and prosperity’ is to be realised by 2020. 
Figure 2 shows that a continuation of the current rates of growth of per capita gross 
                                                 
5 Tonga, for example, was struck by two earthquakes within a month; an earthquake measuring 7.8 on 
the Richter scale struck on 4 May 2006 followed by another measuring 6.7 on the Richter scale on 28 
May 2006.  Neither of these is reported to have caused major damage; this is in sharp contrast to the 
macroeconomic effects of a salary rise won by public servants in the aftermath of their seven-week-
long strike of the previous year. 
6 There is a large and growing literature showing the link between conflict and chronic poverty 
(Goodman, 2003) 
7 Tuvalu appears to provide an even sharper contrast on this front, but with this data being drawn from 
the World Fact Book it is likely to be of lower quality than the World Bank data for Kiribati. 
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national income (GNI) will see Cook Islanders reach a per capita GNI of US$14,000 
by 2020; this would be equal to 60 percent of the current per capita GNI of New 
Zealand.8  Sustaining the past rate of growth for Samoa until 2020 will see it’s per 
capita GNI, at official exchange rates, reach US$5,000 or equal to 22 percent of the 
2004-GNI for New Zealand.9  The 2020 prospects for Nauru, Solomon Islands, and 
Vanuatu look particularly bad given that their per capita GNI has been slipping back 
at rates in excess of 2 percent per annum.10  Lasting peace for the FICs will require 
much greater prosperity.   
 
Population and the Environment 
17. Population growth in the FICs is high and likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future.  Fertility rates, defined as the number of children per women, within the FICs 
ranges from 2.5 for Palau to 5.3 for Solomon Islands (see table 3), thus the difference 
in the rates of growth of the domestic population is principally determined by the 
extent of out migration.  The population growth momentum in the FIC-region is likely 
to continue given the largely young population.  Table 3 shows that some 40 percent 
of the FIC-population (equal to 3.1 million of the 7.8 million total) was below 15 
years of age as of 2004.  Papua New Guinea alone accounted for some 2.3 million, or 
some 74 percent, of the total 0-14 year old population of the FIC-region.   
 
18. A young population can be a resource for raising economic growth, but this 
necessitates equipping the workforce with skills in demand.  While the case for up-
skilling of the workforce pervades the FICs, particularly when compared to Malta, 
PNG provides the strongest case for greater investments in the above.  Nearly half of 
the PNG-workforce is illiterate thus ill equipped to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by globalisation.  The loss from this handicap is potentially 
large since these workers remain trapped within the subsistence sector and often 
within their own localities.  PNG has the resources to generate its own jobs; the large 
proportion of its population being young can, therefore, be an important resource for 
the growth of the economy.  The situation for the resource-scarce Micronesian states 
is dissimilar, but the workers with the requisite skills have been able to find gainful 
employment both at home and abroad.  The case of Kiribati is instructive in this 
regard since its strategy of training seamen and nurses is now providing dividends in 
terms of increased remittances.   
 
19. The imperative of job growth within urban centres and access to basic services 
such as urban infrastructure, basic education, and primary healthcare will increase as 
rural/outer-island-to-urban migration continues.  Most urban centres in the FICs, the 
capital cities in particular, have witnessed a steady inflow of migrants; urban swell, 
                                                 
8  Note that the GNI figures used in Figure 1 are different to those of the PPP-adjusted GDP figures 
reported in table 1.  GNI takes into account net transfers, remittance flows particularly, and the 
conversions into US$ is done at the official exchange rate.  PPP-adjusted GNI figures are not available 
for several FICs.   
9 New Zealand is used for comparisons given the easy access Cook Islanders and Samoans have to this 
country. 
10 It is hard to imagine that per capita income will continue to shrink in Solomon Islands at the past rate 
of 5.69 percent per annum. 
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however, has still a long way to go in the more populous Melanesia given the 
relatively low levels of urbanisation in a number of these countries.11   
 
20. Problems of squatting and land disputes within the urban centres and its 
immediate periphery have increased over time; this trend is likely to continue with 
rising urbanisation.  For the vast majority of urban settlers, the difference between 
being in or out of poverty is whether the family head is able to hold on to a regular 
income source.  Those at the greatest risk of falling into poverty are the unskilled 
landless families who neither have the savings nor the fallback of subsistence living in 
urban settings.  The traditional safety net, moreover, is eroding with an increasing 
number of youth raised within urban centres unable to go back to the villages or live 
off the land of their kin.12     
 
21. Pressure on natural resources is uneven across the FICs but on the whole rising.  
Population densities within the FICs range from 8 persons per square kilometre in 
Niue to 619 on Nauru; these figures on the whole compare favourably to the 3Ms (see 
table 1).  The country-aggregates, however, mask the large variations within the FICs 
and the problems with accessing land for housing and enterprise.  Urban slums have 
mushroomed throughout the FICs, and over-crowding is a serious issue in a number 
of the urban centres.  Jenrok, a crowded settlement on Majuro, which is home to some 
200 households or some 2,000 individuals all housed on 6.5 hectares of land is a good 
case in point.  Jenrok has a population density of 28,000 people per square kilometre 
and is experiencing serious social problems including drug abuse, crime, and youth 
suicides and a near collapse of the coastal environment (see ADB, 2005).   
 
Sustainable resource use for sustained growth 
22. Sustained growth necessitates sustainable management of the nation’s resources.  
A call was made at the 2002 FEMM for mainstreaming of environmental issues into 
physical and economic planning.  Reversing environmental degradation in some of 
the heavily populated areas remains a pressing concern in several FICs.  Sustainable 
growth predicated on effective management of the environment is particularly 
difficult for the Micronesian states where the environment is particularly fragile.  The 
high population growth rates of the past, accompanied by rising population densities, 
have placed a severe toll on some of the surrounding ecosystems.  In a few cases, the 
extent of the environmental degradation has gone beyond the natural regenerative 
capacity13 
 
23. Increases in infectious and life-style diseases across the FICs are eroding the 
human resource base that is critical for income growth.  People incapacitated by these 
preventable ailments raise demand for health outlays whilst reducing the workforce, 
both directly as the sick withdraw from the workforce and indirectly by pulling out 
their carers with them.  Nearly half of the population of Nauru has type-II diabetes.  
HIV/AIDS has already reached epidemic proportions in Papua New Guinea and is 
                                                 
11 PNG, as an example, has less than 20 percent of its population residing in urban centres when the 
comparative figures for many African economies at a similar level of development is around 50 
percent. 
12 Graffiti on the wall of a public convenience in Port Moresby aptly captures the plight of such 
individuals; it reads, “I live to rob and rob to live”. 
13 ‘Subsistence affluence’ for these folk is a distant memory.  Many residents in the urban centres of the 
FICs risk starvation from interruption of international shipping services. 
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spreading across to the rest of the FICs.  The disease affects every facet of life; the 
economic and social costs of a HIV epidemic could be far more catastrophic then any 
of the previous disasters encountered in the region.14   
 
Governance and Growth 
24. Poor governance remains an issue of serious concern.15  FEMM emphasised the 
centrality of ‘Governance and Accountability’ in providing the foundations for private 
enterprise and noted the drag poor governance in the form of “increasing corruption 
… and poor fiscal management” has placed on the development within the region.  
The ‘Eight Principles of Accountability’ were created out of these concerns and the 
Ministers had resolved to increasing transparency in decision-making (FEMM Action 
Plan, 2002).  Progress in terms of improved governance remains slow with the FICs 
continuing to lag behind other nations in terms of ‘Government Effectiveness’, ‘Rule 
of Law’, and ‘Control of Corruption’ (see Figures 3, 4 and 5).16  
 
25. Policy and political instability continue to plague the region.  Cross border 
spillovers from the occasional civil strife in member nations is of increasing concern.  
On the last mentioned, FEMM noted the damaging effects of the coups in Fiji and the 
ethnic tensions in Solomon Islands and discussed the impact of frequent natural 
disasters on their economies.  The April 2006 riots of Honiara continue to portray the 
FIC region as one of high security risk.  
 
26. In sum, many of the problems listed above have been known for a while; 
progress in terms of addressing some of these has been less than enviable however.  
The very first FEMM, for example, noted that: 
“private sector development is central to ensuring sustained economic growth, 
and that governments should provide a policy environment to encourage this.” 
(FEMM Action Plan, 1997; page 47). 
Each FEMM since has reiterated the importance of growth; the central role of the 
private sector in job creation; the role of the public sector in providing the needed 
regulatory environment for private sector investment; and, a more recent emphasis on 
strengthening institutions for improved economic performance.  Ministers have 
repeatedly acknowledged that low economic growth is the cause of many of their 
economic and social ills. 
 
3. Policy lessons from past experimentation 
27. The FICs have experimented with a wide range of policies targeted at raising 
growth.  Here we draw on seven specific lessons from past experimentation with 
growth-enhancing strategies.  The lessons include: (i) import substituting 
industrialisation has on the whole been a failure; (ii) state-led development has had 
                                                 
14 The experience of Botswana where some 40 percent of the population has been infected with HIV 
would be the worst nightmare for PNG.  Interestingly, PNG had the first case of HIV about the same 
time as Botswana but did not experience a similar increase over time.  
15 Not withstanding the ongoing debate on the definition, governance here refers to the exercise of 
authority for public good.  It includes the exercise of power, vested in the individual or organisation 
either by the traditions and/or legislation, and includes the processes via which citizens are given a 
voice in public decision-making.  The country-level measures for good governance include political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,  the rule of law, control of corruption, and voice 
and accountability (see Nanda, 2006; and, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2005).  
16 Of the remaining three indicators, namely, that of Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, and 
Regulatory Quality, the FICs compare unfavourably with ANZ and two of the 3Ms. 
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very limited success; (iii) communally owned land can be accessed for private 
enterprise; (iv) public-private sector partnership have had some recent success; (v) 
regional trading arrangements have proved to be problematic; (vi) good economics 
can be good politics; and, (vii) superior economic management is required for 
resource abundance to lead to improved developmental outcomes.   
 
28. Several FICs embarked on economic reforms to raise the rate of growth of 
income.  The success in reform implementation and in raising the rate of growth of 
income is mixed, however.17  Vanuatu’s Comprehensive Reform Program (CRP) was 
successful in restoring the health of the financial sector and in containing growing 
budget deficits.  Samoa and Cook Islands achieved macroeconomic stability but were 
also able to make additional ground with microeconomic reforms.  Samoa, for 
example, deregulated its financial sector, removed price subsidies on major crops, 
instituted tax and tariff reforms as part of trade liberalisation, and introduced new 
governance arrangements that are consistent with available best practice for their state 
owned enterprises.  The dividends in terms of higher growth rates are being reaped.18  
 
29. Import substituting industrialisation has been experimented with in several of the 
FICs.  Many industries were developed through substantial tariff protection afforded 
to domestic manufacturing, including those given to downstream processing 
activities.  Domestic consumers paid the price (the tax) for the establishment of these 
industries. The economic case for such support can be made only if the protection is 
temporary and leads to the establishment of a local industrial base; this justification is 
referred to as the ‘infant-industry argument’ for protection.   
 
30. A rare example of the successful use of this strategy within the FICs is the case 
of biscuit manufacturing in Fiji.  The industry was established in the period when 
tariffs on biscuits were extremely high.  The effective rate of protection on bakery 
products in Fiji in 1991 was in excess of 600 percent.  Two local manufacturers were 
subsequently successful in exporting their products without the need for continuing 
protection.  This particular ‘infant industry’ matured.  Fiji now exports biscuits not 
only to the other FICs but also to Australia and New Zealand.  It is hard to know if the 
industry would have established itself without the initial protection, but the 
conclusions drawn above give the benefit of doubt in favour of the infant industry 
argument for protection.  However, in the decade to 1991 Fiji provided similarly high 
levels of protection to meat products, flour milling and cereals, paper and printing, 
cement and concrete products, and scores of others, but none to date have matured 
into successful export industries (Chand, 1996). 
 
31. Protection to create domestic industry can be a high-risk strategy.  Assuming that 
the above-mentioned case of Fiji-biscuits was a successful use of infant industry 
protection, this rare success amongst scores of products that were protected would 
suggest that the probability of successful use of infant industry protection is small.  
                                                 
17 There generally is a long time lag between reforms and the rewards of these interventions thus it may 
be a bit too early to gauge the success of reforms within the FICs. 
18 Concerns, however, have been expressed regarding the gradual loosening of public expenditure since 
2000 that has been funded with domestic borrowings (Sialaoa, 2005). 
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The successes with infant industry protection from the other FICs are rare.19  The case 
of a state owned and operated poultry farm on the outskirts of Port Moresby that was 
closed in 1999 can be used to illustrate the more common occurrence.  The farm had 
been making losses since its inception.  This was despite a duty of K2.40 per kilogram 
for imported poultry; thus, the PNG consumer was paying a price premium, at the 
prevailing exchange rate, nearly equal to the price of poultry in Australia.  The 
consumer was slugged twice from the protection afforded to this industry; first in the 
form of a price premium paid on the imports and their local substitutes, and again 
through the taxes paid to government that were channelled via the budget to support 
the farm.   
 
32. Cement, fabricated steel, and other similar building products have been protected 
in nearly every FIC on the grounds of inducing the development of a local industrial 
base.  The higher price paid for these products than their landed-price at the ports 
makes local production using them as inputs internationally uncompetitive.  Duty-
drawback schemes have provided some relief, but only to exports and have in the 
process added another layer of complexity to the tax system.  Protection of domestic 
industry has, on the whole, been damaging to export competitiveness, even though 
occasional exceptions, as in the case of Fiji biscuits, can be found.  
 
33. Jobs created on the basis of trade preferences, including domestic protection, 
often last only until the preferences remain.  Fiji made a marked shift from import-
substituting industrialisation after the 1987 coups, which saw rapid growth of labour-
intensive manufacturing, mainly garments, that was helped by preferential access 
given to the product in industrial country markets.  These jobs are now disappearing 
as preferences are withdrawn. 
 
34. Protection of domestic industry has on the whole hampered job creation.  This is 
because the protected sector in the FICs, in general, have been capital intensive while 
the sectors discriminated against in the process have tended to be labour intensive.  
One FIC government, as an example, recently proposed to impose a tax on exports of 
cocoa beans, on the grounds that it will induce the setting up of a local processing 
plant.  If such a policy is adopted, the farmers will receive a price lower, by the value 
of the tax, than the world market price for the product.  This will lower the income of 
farmers and reward the owners and employees of the (capital intensive) processing 
plant.  Jobs will be lost in the process since processing of cocoa beans is far more 
capital intensive than the growing of the crop.   
 
35. The protection of capital-intensive industries such as cement and metal 
fabrication raises the costs of building and thus constitutes an income transfer from 
the masses to the owners and employees of the protected industry.  Protection to 
inputs creates demand for protection of finals goods that use the above as inputs, 
adding further layers of complication to the tax system.  The political economy of 
protection makes it extremely difficult to withdraw such support once it is granted.  
Much like any public handout, those who are likely to lose from the withdrawal of 
assistance tend to be few and geographically concentrated and thus better organised 
                                                 
19 I cannot think of any other examples, other than Fiji biscuits, as cases of successful use of infant-
industry protection in the FICs as a whole.  This is a common finding from the broader development 
literature. 
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compared to the potential beneficiaries who tend to be dispersed and thus far less well 
organised and vocal.   
 
Lesson 1: Given the low probability of success in the use of the infant industry 
protection, the adverse impact it has on job creation and income distribution, and the 
difficulty of withdrawing support once offered, policymaker would be well advised to 
be cautious of using this strategy for growth.   
 
36. State-led development has, on the whole, been a failure.  Several FIC 
governments after independence embarked upon the establishment of state run 
enterprises on the grounds that the private sector would not provide these services.  
National Airlines and state run utility companies were set up to fill this perceived 
void.  These interventions at best promoted growth of private enterprise (this is the 
case of ‘crowding-in’) and at worst stultified private entrepreneurship.  There is 
evidence of both.  The colonial government pre-independence initiated the 
establishment of the oil-palm industry in Papua New Guinea.  Under its land 
resettlement scheme, farmers from the more populous regions of the Highlands and 
the Sepiks were relocated to Bouganville and West New Britain to expand production 
of cocoa and oil palm.  The private sector took a lead role in the establishment and 
growth of Oil Palm; with the private company establishing its plant and support 
services on alienated land (this being the ‘nucleus’) while encouraging supply of 
produce from the surrounding areas.  The Fiji sugar industry was established on a 
very similar basis, where the mills were established on freehold land while sugarcane 
growing was out-sourced to the smallholder sector that, in the main, utilised 
communally owned land. 
 
37. However, examples of the public sector stultifying growth of private enterprise 
are a lot more common.  For example, the state has taken an active role in the 
provision of shipping services whereby the services have been heavily subsidised 
from the budget and/or private operators have been taxed when viewed as operating in 
competition with state-owned ships.  The case of Solomon Islands is most 
illuminating on this count.  The Provincial governments run their own ships and 
private operators were charged as much as SI$5,000 for every landing on their ports.  
The Republic of Marshall Islands had a similar scheme until 2004 but then tendered 
out its unprofitable routes to a private operator only to restart operations once the 
private operator had begun operations.  The cases of state-owned and operated airlines 
have shown a similar pattern.  Governments have been reluctant to let go of airlines 
that have been profitable and protected the most profitable (dense) routes from 
competition, even at a cost to tourist arrivals into their countries.  In the few cases of 
loss making airlines, these have been propped up with budgetary support until the 
fiscal burden became unbearable.  The poor record of the state in running enterprises 
in competition with the private sector is not unique to the FICs; there are many 
examples from the developing world where state-run enterprises have come out 
second best when operating in competition with the private sector.   
 
38. If it is certain that the private sector will not provide the needed services, 
governments could consider tendering out the provision of the services to the private 
sector.  The PNG experience with its commodity boards for cocoa, coffee, and copra 
demonstrated that a competitive marketing structure is a better strategy than the use of 
parastatal monopolies for exports.  These outcomes raise the question of privatisation; 
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that is, how can the FIC-governments withdraw from active participation in 
commerce.  An in-depth coverage of this issue is beyond the purview of this paper but 
the successful privatisation of Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation (PNGBC), 
the National Bank of Vanuatu (NBV), and Polynesian Blue provide lessons for 
others.20 
 
Lesson 2: A risk-averse policymaker would be well advised to steer clear of using 
state owned enterprises as a means to inducing growth of private enterprise.   
 
39. Access to land for large-scale commercial agriculture and for development of 
tourist facilities that require long-term security of access to the resource remains a 
vexed issue in most of the FICs.  The 3Ms may have some lessons for the FICs on this 
issue given that they have been highly successful in attracting large foreign 
investments in the development of resorts and related tourist infrastructure.  
Mauritius, for example, is providing state land that was used for sugarcane farming 
for development of resorts. The Maldives government leases islands for development 
of tourism infrastructure by private investors on a competitive basis.21 Closer to home, 
the Denarau complex in Fiji provides another model where communally-owned land 
in combination with freehold and state-owned land have been used jointly by private 
multinationals to build resorts and accompanying facilities of the highest quality.22   
 
Lesson 3: Improving access to land for large-scale private enterprise remains a vexed 
issue and one that needs to be addressed soon.  There are models of success from 
Mauritius, Maldives, and Fiji that could be adapted to improve access to communally 
owned land for private enterprise. 
 
40. Access to competitively priced credit has been a longstanding problem in the 
FICs.  State-owned Development Banks have had limited success in alleviating this 
constraint.  The poor access to credit has been due to macroeconomic instability, the 
lack of collateral, the absence of creditor records, and the high costs of enforcing debt 
contracts; addressing these factors is likely to be far more productive in lowering the 
cost of credit than setting up government-owned banks.  Recent experimentation with 
provision of rural banking services by a commercial bank in partnership with the State 
in Fiji and Solomon Islands is a model of greater promise for the rest of the region.  
The State, moreover, has a critical role in the provision of prudential supervision and 
in reducing the costs of enforcing debt contracts. 
 
Lesson 4: Extension of subsidised credit via state-owned development banks is 
unlikely to have the desired effects.  The 2005 FEMM, in its endeavour to reduce 
costs of doing business, had agreed to: “addressing issues of collateral, access to 
credit and enforcement of contracts” (FEMM Action Plan, 2005, paragraph 7).  The 
above together with encouragement to the private and informal sector in the provision 
of banking services to the rural sector holds greater promise.  
 
41. Attempts at increasing international trade through regional trading arrangements 
have had limited success.  The confluence of canned beef, biscuits, and kava in 
                                                 
20 An alternative would be build-own-operate-and-transfer (BOOT) schemes; this is considered in an 
out of session paper. 
21 See http://www.maldiveisle.com/tourismsector.htm 
22 See http://www.denarau.com/ 
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Melanesia often meant a spontaneous party!  This has changed dramatically over the 
recent past, however.  There have been repeated threats of a trade war between Fiji, 
PNG, and Vanuatu.  The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) were envisaged as ‘stepping stones’ to freer 
regional and global trade (World Bank, 2002).  Success on this front has been less 
than enviable. 
 
42. Preferential access into industrial country markets, such as those for sugar from 
the ACP states into the EC and garments via the South Pacific Regional Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) and the now expired Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA), have had limited success in creating a domestic industry that is 
able to survive without the need for continued support.  The continued erosion of the 
preferences, as assured under the commitments to liberalising global trade under the 
auspices of the WTO, and an impending FTA between China and Australia, will 
create further pressures for adjustment.   
 
43. The newly proposed Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by the EC 
provides an opportunity for MFN-based liberalisation around the principles set out in 
Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement.23  EPAs, importantly, have facilities for 
adjustment assistance towards most favoured nation (MFN)-based trade liberalisation.  
The initiative for further liberalisation of trade by FICs, therefore, could be 
undertaken unilaterally and on a MFN-basis without risking further regional trade 
conflicts.  The Pacific Islands Forum Representative Office in Geneva that began 
operations in July 2004 could be drawn upon for technical assistance with WTO- 
compliant MFN-based trade liberalisation. 
 
Lesson 5: Given the risks of protectionism from regional trading arrangements, 
consideration could be given to greater use of the multilateral route to trade 
liberalisation.  Furthermore, the multilateral path to trade liberalisation could be 
taken unilaterally and without compromising the existing commitments to regional 
trading agreements.24
 
44. Political instability and weakened governance have risen with economic decline.  
The experience of Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 shows that 
holding on to political office becomes extremely difficult during an economic 
collapse while the decade-plus of Human Rights Protection Party in Samoa suggests 
that voters reward office-holders for superior economic performance.25  Governments 
have lost office in periods of fiscal crisis in Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu.   
Political turmoil triggered by an economic crisis led to fragmentation of political 
parties in Nauru, PNG, and Vanuatu, that in turn led to an era of political instability.  
Governance has deteriorated with economic decline; governments most desperate for 
funds have often attracted ‘snake-oil’ merchants who in turn have contributed to 
                                                 
23 The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lomé Convention, and is valid for a period of 20 years, subject 
to revision every 5 years.  The EC and the ACP States signed this Agreement in Cotonou, Benin on 
23rd June 2000. 
24  The suggested path of multilateral liberalisation is consistent with the concept of ‘open regionalism’ 
as expounded under APEC commitments. 
25 The decade of Liberal Government in Australia is another case in point. 
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further deterioration in governance.26  Holding on to power in the face of continuous 
economic decline has proved to be increasingly difficult in the region.  In short, good 
economic management leading to a superior economic performance can reduce 
political instability and reward the incumbent government.  
 
45. The feedback between economic decline and political instability can lead to a 
vicious circle and thus to a trap of continuing instability and poor economic 
performance.  Reversing the feedback could have high rewards in terms of triggering 
a virtuous feedback from economic growth to political stability.  Papua New Guinea 
seems to have been successful in reversing the negative feedback whereby economic 
decline led to increased political instability to one of economic growth with increased 
political (and policy) stability.  The two factors responsible for this switch from a 
vicious to a virtuous feedback between political stability and economic performance 
were: first, the healthy movements in its terms of trade such that export earnings 
improved in the last electoral cycle; and, second, the passage of the Organic Law on 
the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates (2000) and Central Bank Act of 
2000.  The first of the above was part of good fortune but the latter two were the 
product of deliberate policies targeted at reducing political (and policy) instability27 
and reducing political interference in the conduct of monetary policy.   
 
Lesson 6: The recent PNG experience provides policy lessons for reducing political 
and macroeconomic instability and demonstrates the rewards to office-holders of 
good macroeconomic management. 
 
46. Superior economic management is required for resource rents to be used for 
long-run growth in income. The post-independence experience of Nauru has lessons 
for others.  Nauru was the second FIC (after Samoa which gained independence in 
January 1962) to have gained independence, in January 1968.  It was then thought that 
the rich phosphate resources would provide the basis for long-term development of 
the nation but this, with the benefit of hindsight, was not the case. The resource 
abundance led to high wages, low participation in the workforce, and reduced 
incentives to invest in skill acquisition, while much of the resource rents were lost due 
to poor governance.  Tuvalu, with a similarly sized population but without the 
resources that Nauru had, has successfully managed its trust fund and thus avoided the 
problems besetting Nauru.28   
 
47. Another of the negative consequences of resource abundance, referred to as the 
‘resource curse’, arises from a heavy dependence on a few non-renewable resources 
that then leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, thus penalising the other 
export sectors of the economy.  The discovery of large mining deposits has often led 
to wage inflation, particularly for those with formal training, and further narrowing of 
the production base.  Large quantities of aid run similar risks.29  Rents, and the 
                                                 
26 Fly-by-night financiers supposedly with billions of dollars in hand and those with supernatural 
healing powers have frequented the FICs at their most desperate moments. 
27 This law was introduced to promote formation of political parties, induce their longevity, and 
stabilize executive governments (Reilly, 2002). 
28 Kiribati has also managed its Trust Fund well but this is a much larger economy than Nauru’s. 
29 Palau, on per capita terms, is one of the largest recipients of aid and the FICs in general rank high 
compared to countries with similar levels of per capita GDP.  The impact of aid on growth of the FICs 
remains to be ascertained, however. 
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competition for these, can have a deleterious impact on institutions of civil society.  
The conflict in Solomon Islands and that in Bougainville that led to the closure of 
their only (large) copper mine are examples where competition for rents led to 
disastrous outcomes including the destruction of social, physical, and environmental 
capital.   
 
48. The issue here is not the presence of (resource) rents per se but the lack of the 
capacity to manage these rents for the benefit of the present and future generations.30  
The experience of PNG and Nauru with mining demonstrates the perils of a mining 
boom without the capacity to manage it for development.  The resource rich FICs 
have failed to invest the income derived from liquidating their non-renewable 
resources into alternative forms of capital to the extent that in a number of cases 
mining has led to a depletion of the aggregate capital base of the economy.  This has 
serious inter-generational consequences as the future generations no longer have 
access to the depleted resources or the income derived from the liquidation of these 
resources.31  
 
49. The FICs, as a group, are rich in marine resources.  The Pacific Ocean spans 
more than half the surface area of the planet, fisheries alone contributes some 11 
percent of the FICs GDP, and tuna constitutes the only significant natural resource for 
several of the smallest FICs.  The two major concerns with the management of the 
fisheries resources of the region are: (i) maximising returns from the given stock; and, 
(ii) the challenge of ensuring long-term sustainability of this resource.  Sea bed 
mining has potential and it will raise issues of non-renewable resource extraction 
alluded to in the two preceding paragraphs.      
 
Lesson 7: Natural resource abundance should not be a handicap but its presence 
demands superior economic management for the ensuing income to be translated into 
superior developmental outcomes.  
 
4. The challenges and opportunities 
50. This section highlights the challenges that need to be addressed and the 
opportunities that could be realised to raise the rate of growth of income.  The 
challenges, if successfully addressed, offer the opportunities for growth.  Country 
context, however, is important in the considerations that follow.  The seven specific 
challenges/opportunities considered next include: (i) the creation of the conditions for 
job growth and thus exploitation of the benefits of using idle resources for growth of 
production; (ii) the use of technological improvements for raising agricultural 
productivity; (iii) the use of international labour mobility for growth; (iv) the 
improvements in personal security for growth of tourism; (v) freeing up of regional 
aviation and telecommunications markets to realise the benefit of greater economies 
of scale; (vi) improvements in governance via inducing greater demand for the same; 
and, (vii) the under-writing of security within member states in order to reduce 
sovereign risk for greater private investment and thus growth. 
 
51. Many of the FICs have idle labour, land, and marine resources.  Bringing them 
into production is as much a challenge as an opportunity for raising income in the 
                                                 
30 Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) show that revenues from natural resources that lend 
themselves to easy appropriation have an adverse impact on the quality of a nation’s institutions. 
31  That is, policymakers have been negligent of the ‘Hartwick rule’. 
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short to medium term.  The challenge for policy is to create the conditions for 
increased private investment leading to job growth and increased utilisation of idle 
land and marine resources and on a sustainable basis.  The vast tracts of under-utilised 
land in several Melanesian countries, the Gudalcanal plains for example, suggest that 
these conditions do not, as yet, exist.  The owners of these resources, however, remain 
income-poor.   
 
Challenge/Opportunity 1: Create the conditions for job growth and productive use of 
idle resources.  The commitment by FEMM to halve the costs of doing business by 
2007 is encouraging in this regard.  Monitoring of progress and any remedial action 
that may be necessary to achieve this target is crucial for success on this front. 
 
52. The vast majority of the FIC population live off their land and this includes the 
majority of the poor.  Some 80 percent of the 5.5 million residents of PNG draw their 
livelihood from the rural sector.  In terms of numbers, these individuals make up more 
than the rest of the FIC population.  Agricultural productivity, therefore, would need 
to rise if the majority of the population is to witness an improvement in their 
wellbeing.  There is little evidence of improvements in agricultural productivity, 
however (Reddy and Duncan, 2006).  A more concerted effort at land reform and use 
of modern technology is likely to produce dividends in terms of increased 
productivity.  Vanuatu and PNG, for example, have had considerable success in 
breeding high-yielding and disease resistant copra and oil palm, respectively.  Oil 
Palm and Sugar industries in PNG and Fiji, respectively, have had some success in 
drawing on communally owned land for commercial agriculture.  These models could 
be adapted/adopted elsewhere for other crops and countries. 
 
Challenge/Opportunity 2: Poverty reduction in the short to medium term warrants 
improvements in agricultural productivity.  There is an opportunity to improve long-
term and secure access to land, the dissemination of high-yielding crops that have 
been developed from within the region and abroad, and the use of modern technology 
to raise farm productivity.   
 
53. People represent the Pacific’s best resource, and as such are potentially the most 
important source of growth for the future (see the case of Malta in paragraph 10). 
However, a scenario where all of the region’s labour is productively employed at 
home within the short term may be unrealistic.  Additional opportunities for 
employment, moreover, will not occur without sustained efforts at improving the 
investment climate within the individual economies and the region more broadly.  It is 
clear that the private sector will be the source of job growth while the role of the 
public sector will be in creating the conditions, including providing the regulatory 
environment, for increased private sector investment. Private enterprise has noted that 
policy instability, poor contract enforcement, and the poor and deteriorating law and 
order situation in a number of the countries has impeded investments; these concerns 
will need to be addressed.   
 
54. Those who will be entering the workforce over the next 15 years, that is, up to 
2020, are already amongst us.  Table 4 provides data on the prevailing size of the 
work-age population, the level of the total formal sector employment, and the rate of 
entry of new job seekers.  The last right-hand column shows that, with the lone 
exception of Fiji, the workforce will grow at approximately 5 percent in nearly every 
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FIC for the foreseeable future.  Assuming that labour-productivity increases one 
percentage point per year and that there is unimpeded access to capital from the global 
marketplace, the economies could grow at a rate of 6 percent per annum simply by 
absorbing those entering the workforce.  Given that the rate of population growth is 
falling as fertility rates decline, the above demographic transition will lead to an 
increase in per capita income in the interim. The FICs are in an enviable position vis-
à-vis Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of the industrialised world where this 
‘demographic bonus’ is now in reverse.32 
 
55. The third column in table 4 (and the figures in parenthesis) shows that the formal 
sector is unlikely to absorb all those who enter the workforce.  Formal sector 
employment in PNG, as one example, would have to expand by 85 percent if it were 
to absorb the 18,600 new job seekers each year.  Such growth is unlikely given that 
the public sector accounts for a large proportion of formal sector employment and the 
fact that public sector downsizing is in place in nearly every FIC.  Besides improving 
the domestic employment climate, FICs could over the short term consider exporting 
their excess labour.   
 
56. Labour mobility is an issue of existing interest to the countries of the region. 
Ministers at the 2005 FEMM “supported the need for further examination of Pacific 
labour market issues at the regional level”, with one specific area of interest being 
“the promotion of labour mobility through the region and beyond”.  Similarly, at their 
last meeting the Forum Leaders agreed to continue to consider the issue of labour 
mobility in the context of member countries’ immigration policies’ (36th Pacific 
Islands Forum Communique, 2005: PIFS(05) 12).  The arguments around 
international labour mobility for sustainable livelihood differ across the individual 
FICs, however.  The Micronesian states have very high population densities, a 
diminishing capacity of the environment to sustain this population at home on 
subsistence alone, and thus perhaps have the most persuasive and immediate case for 
out-migration.  In other parts of the region other factors figure more prominently.  
International labour mobility, and this could very much be within the FICs or more 
broadly, could serve as an effective response to macroeconomic shocks. The mobility 
of workers from small regions, and particularly those at risk of facing frequent natural 
disasters, provides a means for employment diversification in the face of frequent 
adverse shocks. Furthermore, in those countries facing the most significant 
governance challenges, labour mobility could induce better governance by allowing 
people to ‘vote with their feet’. 
 
57. Access to industrial country labour markets, even for the smallest and resource 
poor states, is likely to have the largest long run effects on poverty if the labour force 
is ‘tooled-up’ to take advantage of the opportunities abroad.  The contrasting cases of 
Kiribati and Marshall Islands demonstrate some of the risks of unimpeded access to 
foreign labour markets.  Kiribati does not have privileged access to industrial country 
labour markets, but trains a small workforce that has traditionally managed to get 
employment on foreign vessels.  These workers have provided remittances to their 
families and the scheme has been relatively successful.  The Marshallese workers 
have unfretted access into the US under their Compact of Free Association but 
                                                 
32 The ‘demographic bonus’ is the excess of the rate of increase of the workforce vis-à-vis the 
population.  
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poverty and high unemployment have persisted over the past decade.  While the USA 
in this period has succeeded in keeping unemployment low and stable, the Marshall 
Islands has witnessed a persistent rise in its unemployment rate (ADB, 2005).   
 
58. The majority of the Marshallese who have emigrated have not fared much better 
than their counterparts at home.  Of the 2000 Marshallese living in Hawaii and 
surveyed in 2003, some 49 percent lived below the (Hawaiian) poverty line.  Net 
remittances into Marshall Islands for the past decade have been negative (ADB, 
2005).  The reasons for this outcome, according to ADB (2005), include the lack of 
skills of migrant Marshallese.  However, temporary migration of unskilled and semi-
skilled workers will in the immediate to short term lower poverty since even migrants 
working in low wage jobs tend to save and remit some money home whilst 
developing skills and attitudes that enable them to be more productive workers on 
their return. 
 
59. Sustained poverty reduction, therefore, requires mobility of workers up the wage 
ladder.  Such mobility, however, takes time, as it requires appropriate training.  
Access to training facilities at home, therefore, is essential if workers are to be able to 
take advantage of opportunities both at home and abroad.  The trainees and their 
families, moreover, must have the income (liquidity) and the incentives to release a 
potential worker for studies.  Absent perfect capital markets, temporary labour 
mobility for those unable or unlikely to be trained provides the liquidity while long-
term access on the basis of skills the incentives for the above-mentioned.  That is, 
labour mobility, particularly where it is temporary, of unskilled and semi-skilled 
workers, could help to meet the current demand for jobs in the FICs whilst providing 
the incentives and the funds for investment into skill upgrading.  
 
Challenge/Opportunity 3: Temporary access to the labour market in ANZ for school 
dropouts and those unlikely to go back to school such as those above 35 years of age 
will fill an immediate void for jobs in the FICs whilst providing the liquidity and the 
incentives for investment in skill acquisition within the more able population.  The last 
necessitates availability of requisite training facilities, information, and portability of 
skills.  This is consistent with the case made within the Pacific Plan for improved 
technical and vocational education and the standardisation of qualifications across 
the region. 
 
60. Tourism provides the greatest prospects for job creation within several FICs.  
Their isolation from the major industrial centres has left the natural environment in a 
number of the Pacific Islands free of industrial pollutants.33  Pacific Islanders, on the 
whole, are extremely hospitable people.34  The growth of this sector has varied over 
time but there remains considerable potential for further expansion.  Fiji, the most 
successful of the FICs, received some 110,000 tourists in 1970; by 2005, the number 
of arrivals had reached some half a million.  The five-fold increase in tourist arrivals 
is impressive but Mauritius, a lot smaller nation with far fewer natural attractions, 
received some 700,000 tourists in 2005.  Fiji and Mauritius are very similar in many 
respects including targeting the high-value end of the market, but Fiji has the 
advantages of a larger physical size, better geographic positioning in being close to 
                                                 
33 Radioactive waste left after nuclear testing in the Northern Pacific is an exception, however.  
34 This includes the vast majority of Papua New Guineans. 
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ANZ and Asia, and a lot more natural attractions (see paragraph 11).  Bali, another 
much smaller competitor of Fiji, received more than one million tourists annually 
until the tsunami of December 2004.  Papua New Guinea, a much larger country with 
far more natural and historical attractions, attracted some 61,000 tourists in 2004.35   
 
61. The poor performance of the tourism sector in the FICs is attributed to a lack of 
personal security, health risks as those due to the prevalence of malaria, poor and high 
cost of travel, and the insecurity of property rights to land-based investments such as 
into hotels and resorts (Yala and Duncan, 2006).  The above-mentioned issues except 
for personal security have been addressed above.  The number of tourist arrivals into 
Fiji fell sharply in the aftermath of each of the three coups.  Security is a strong factor 
in determining tourism flows.  Being small and isolated from the rest of the world, the 
FICs have a comparative advantage in providing security and thus could use this fact 
to their competitive advantage.   
 
62. Improving personal security has the potential to attract a lot more tourists, as well 
as generating major benefits for the local population.  Port Moresby is notorious for 
its incidence of crime; while tourists who fall victim to crime get a lot of publicity, the 
majority of the victims of crime are locals.  The donor community has a large appetite 
for expenditure on improvements in law and order.  This is one area of considerable 
overlap in terms of expenditure priorities for donors as for FIC-governments and 
presents itself as a unique opportunity for improving law and order with the joint 
effort of recipient governments and donors.  Such investments have the potential to 
improve the wellbeing of the local population whilst creating more favourable 
conditions for growth in tourist arrivals.  Visitors, and particularly those with families, 
will pay a premium price for such security.   
 
Challenge/Opportunity 4: The FICs can build on and market their more secure 
environment for growth of tourism.   
 
63. Being geographically fragmented, trade and communications, both within and 
across FICs, are extremely difficult.  That is, the challenges in terms of improving 
intra-nation trade are at least as great as that for international trade.  While high 
transportation costs will continue to impose a competitive disadvantage on 
commodity exports, innovations in telecommunications technology, together with 
growth in service exports, are likely to reduce the economic disadvantage from 
physical isolation. Transportation and communication services are major inputs into 
several industries, and thus FIC-governments should encourage competitive supplies 
of these inputs.36  Scale effects from amalgamation of regional markets for these 
services could bring about reductions in the costs of these provisions.  
 
64. Several FIC governments have significant equity in their national airlines (flag 
carriers) and telecommunications companies.  They consequently have protected their 
aviation and telecommunications sectors from foreign competition but to the 
detriment of the growth of the rest of the economy and towards creating a more fluid 
                                                 
35 Data is the most recent available from the National Statistics Office, Port Moresby. 
36 A number of the FICs have been doing the very opposite; that is, taxing the supply of transportation 
and communication services (see Duncan, 2004). 
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(cohesive) society.37  The high costs of transportation and communications services 
have impeded deeper integration within as much as across nation states.  They have 
also hampered growth of industries that use transportation and communications 
intensively; tourism and outsourcing being the most obvious cases in point. 
 
Opportunity 5: The FICs have the opportunity to legislate for an open-skies policy for 
the region as a whole whilst opening up their local markets for these services.  
Carriers could then hub and spoke on commercial considerations alone.38  The same 
could happen for shipping and telecommunications services.39  It is quite feasible that 
in the process some destinations may not get serviced; the economic solution to this 
problem would be in the form of purchasing the desired services on social 
considerations through a competitive tender (see paragraph 38).  
 
65. Poor governance, corruption in particular, remains a serious issue in several 
FICs.  The Vanuatu Chamber of Commerce in 2001 ranked policy instability and 
corruption as the major problems holding back private sector investment (Chand, 
2002).  A similar study in PNG found political instability, high rates of crime, and 
corruption as the major constraints to growth of private investments (Manning, 2005).  
Evidence on weak governance in the FICs is supported by data from two independent 
sources; namely, the US State Department and Kauffman and Kraay (2005).40  While 
the subjectivity and the timeliness of this data make cross-country comparisons 
problematic, they still are indicative of the extent to which weak governance is an 
issue within the FICs.  Table 5 shows that corruption, for the ten FICs for which data 
is available, remains high in comparison to ANZ and the 3Ms.  The qualitative data 
here corroborates well with the quantitative estimates provided by the World Bank 
and reported in Figure 5.  On the last, Samoa and Palau rank most favourably amongst 
the FICs but even they fall short of the benchmarks set by Mauritius and Malta.  
 
66. The quality of governance in many instances has deteriorated whilst ‘institutional 
strengthening’ projects, often funded with donor resources, have been in place within 
the Police and the Offices of the Public Prosecutor, the Auditor General, and the 
Public Accounts Committee.  Interestingly, most of the attempts at improving 
governance in the FICs have been through improving the supply of rather than the 
demand for better governance.41   
 
Challenge/Opportunity 6: Improving governance remains a difficult issue, but there 
is an opportunity to expand the demand for better governance.  This could be done as 
a regional initiative whereby the public, including the media, is given legislated-
access to public information, possibly modelled on similar legislation in ANZ or in 
                                                 
37 Communally-owned land has impeded greater mobility of individual families; this is an issue 
currently being researched on. 
38 Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement (PIASA) tries to do this but has to date had limited success.   
39 This is consistent with the Digital Strategy within the Pacific Plan. 
40 The US State Department provides assessment of the levels of corruption in government and the 
extent of transparency in public decision-making for 196 countries. The State Department notes that: 
“These reports describe the performance of 196 countries in putting into practice their international 
commitments on human rights. These basic rights, reflected in the UN Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, have been embraced by people of every culture and color, every background” sourced from 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61550.htm 
41 The limited support given to the establishment of the offices of Transparency International in a few 
of the FICs and support for the media are exceptions in this regard. 
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Mauritius.  Additionally, journalists and whistle-blowers could be freed from the need 
to reveal the sources of their information whilst being subject to the normal 
defamation legislation. 
 
67. Security breaches, including those highlighted above, now readily spill across 
national borders.  The regional effects of the 1987 Fiji coups were confined to its 
national borders except for disruptions to trade to the surrounding nations that used 
Fiji as a shipping and aviation hub.  The 2000 coup, however, was alleged to have led 
to a copycat coup in Solomon Islands.  There is now concern over ex-Fiji Military 
Forces personnel being involved in the training of a rebel force in Bougainville.  The 
recent standoff between the military and the Fiji Government suggests that power 
once usurped creates the preconditions for its repeat.  Averting conflicts before they 
arise and containing them once they do is, therefore, a regional responsibility.  
Conflicts disrupt growth and raise poverty (Goodman, 2003); interventions to avert 
and contain conflicts, therefore, constitute a backstop against slippage into increased 
poverty.  
 
68. Interventions to avert and/or contain conflicts when undertaken at a regional 
level raise several questions.  When and how should the region respond to conflicts in 
its member countries?  Under what conditions should the region, and the wider 
international community, intervene in an internal conflict without the invitation of the 
host government?  The latter question did not arise in the cases of the Regional 
Assistance Missions to Solomon Islands and Nauru since the host governments 
instigated them, but such invitations are unlikely when the government is taken 
hostage, as was the case for two of the three coups in Fiji.  How can the taxpayer be 
protected from internal threats such as those against coups from its own ‘disciplinary’ 
forces that are trained, equipped, and paid for by the citizenry?  These are difficult 
questions but questions that have to be addressed if peace and stability is to prevail in 
the region.  This brings us to the last and perhaps the most ambitious 
recommendation. 
 
Opportunity 7: Drawing on the Biketawa Declaration, the region as a collective body 
should examine further how it could support the security and integrity of each of its 
member states.  The region could, as an example, consider underwriting the rule of 
law as spelled out in the member nation’s constitution.  That is, the regional 
collectively could commit itself to re-establishing the rule of law as reflected in each 
nation’s constitution and its supporting legislation, when and if power is usurped in 
any member state.  This sounds like an expensive commitment but one that may never 
need to be demonstrated.  A credible commitment to restoring law and order in the 
event that it is usurped can on its own be enough to deter such an activity.   
 
5. Conclusions 
69. In terms of economic performance, the FICs as a group have performed poorly 
compared to similarly endowed economies in the rest of the world.  The small size 
and isolation of island economies from the major markets means special problems in 
respect of development, but these problems have been overcome by other small states 
such as the Maldives, Mauritius, and Malta (the 3Ms).   
 
70. Policies can be used to ameliorate the handicaps of smallness and isolation.  The 
handicap of small size, for example, could be minimised through deeper integration 
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with the global market place.  The debilitating effects of isolation can be reduced by 
taking advantage of technological progress that is delivering lower costs of 
communications and transportation services.42  The exposure to volatile production 
and earnings can be reduced via use of appropriate financial instruments.  In short, 
some of the adversities of smallness and isolation can be overcome by well-targeted 
policies.   
 
71. The poor economic performance of the FICs can, on the whole, be attributed to 
poor policy choices.  The inferior quality of governance distinguishes the poorly 
performing FICs from their better performing counterparts both within the region and 
abroad.  The data in table 5 shows that Palau and Samoa, the better performing FICs, 
have the lowest level of corruption in government within this group.  Within the FIC-
group, neither of these two economies has the advantages of location or size.  On 
international comparisons, the FICs as a group score poorly on this count (see Figure 
5).  Improving governance and security (the two being inter-related) is identified as 
the major challenge in raising growth in the FICs.  Being able to overcome this 
challenge presents the opportunity to bring about poverty reduction within the region.   
 
72. The claims in the preceding paragraph have to be qualified by the fact that there 
is no single recipe for raising growth of income in every FIC.  The FICs are a diverse 
group of economies; each is at a different stage of development, and each with its own 
legacy of past policies.  The experiments of the past offer many lessons on what to do 
and those to avoid; some degree of experimentation and fine-tuning would still be 
necessary as time progresses.  Evidence-based policymaking, however, requires good 
data and this is lacking at the moment.  The key message here is that the recipe for 
raising the rate of growth will differ across the individual FICs, but the ingredients for 
success are most likely to be similar.   
 
73. Many of the policy ingredients for growth are readily identifiable given the 
outcomes of past experimentation. These include a stable macroeconomic 
environment, the presence of clear and enforceable property rights, access to good 
public infrastructure, the presence of an open trading regime, and an accommodating 
international trading environment.  Furthermore, there is a clear sequence of 
interventions if the foundations of growth are to be built.  Macroeconomic conditions 
in terms of fiscal sustainability, low and stable inflation, and internationally 
competitive interest rates have to be in place before the microeconomic foundations 
can be worked upon.  The latter includes a competitive business environment, security 
of person and property, improved contract enforceability, and rewards for risk taking.  
The challenge for policy is to create these conditions.   
 
74. Successful small states, the 3Ms in particular, demonstrate that the handicaps of 
size and isolation can be overcome.  These countries have had considerable success in 
raising growth of income by ensuring good governance, macroeconomic stability, and 
security to returns from private investments.  A few of the FICs have had some 
success in emulating some of the policies of the 3Ms and are reaping the benefits in 
terms of higher growths.  The poorest performing FICs, in contrast, are still struggling 
with political and macroeconomic stability and thus experiencing low rates of private 
investment and job-growth.  It would be unrealistic to expect these countries to be 
                                                 
42 This is commonly referred to as ‘death of distance’ in economic geography. 
 22
able to change their policy settings overnight, thus some breathing space in terms of 
having temporary overseas access to their jobless would be of considerable value. 
 
75.  The particular set of interventions, however, will depend on the economic and 
political circumstances of the individual country.  Moreover, conditions are changing 
so all of the past lessons may not be relevant.  In short, the message for growth 
strategies is that there is not ‘a single strategy for all the FICs’, but this does not imply 
that there is ‘no growth strategy for any individual FIC’. 
 
76. The key message of this paper is that only sustained growth in per capita income 
predicated on sustainable use of all of the nation’s resources can bring about the 
realisation of the vision of lasting ‘peace, harmony, and security’ for the FIC region 
(see paragraph 1).  Forum Economic Ministers endorsed this vision, noting the 
centrality of economic growth in the above (see paragraph 2).  A number of policy-
interventions at the regional level for FEMM have been identified.  It would be 
opportune to debate their pragmatism, particularly at the level of FEMM. 
 
77. The Forum has a role in providing regional public goods such as data collection, 
information dissemination, policy advice, and acting as an anchor against backsliding 
on instituted reforms.  All of the above could be incorporated within the ambits of 
‘measures for good regional governance’ within the Pacific Plan (re page 8).  The 
region could also collectively underwrite security and law and order in the member 
states.  This will lower sovereign risk and encourage private investments thus 
contributing to growth in income.   
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Data Appendix 
Table 1: Basic Indicators for Forum Island Countries (FICs); Australia and New 
Zealand (ANZ); and Maldives, Malta, and Mauritius (The 3Ms) 
 
Country/Group Land area 
(sq km) 
Population 
(‘000) 
(2004) 
Population 
density 
(people/km2)
GDP per 
capita 
(PPP, 
2004$) 
Aid per 
capita 
(2003 US$) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(2003) 
FICs   
Cook Islandsa   
Fiji 18270 848 46 6092 61 70
Kiribati 730 98 134 191 63
Marshall 
Islands 
181 60 331 1600e 991 70e
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 
702 127 181 2000f 923 69
Naurua 21 13 619 5000b .. 63
Niuea 260 2 8 3600c .. ..
Palau 460 20 43 1295 
Papua New 
Guinea 
452860 5625 12 2564 40 57
Samoa 2830 179 63 5694 186 70
Solomon 
Islands 
27990 471 17 1773  70
Tonga 720 102 141 7236 270 71
Tuvalua 26 11 423 1100d .. 68
Vanuatu 12190 215 18 2893 154 69
   
ANZ   
Australia 7682300 20120 3 30116  80
New Zealand 267990 4061 15 22912  79
   
The 3Ms   
Maldives 300 300g 998 3900h 61 69
Malta 320 401 1253 18954 25 79
Mauritius 2030 1234 608 11943 20i 72
   
   
   
Notes: The most recent data available has been used; .. indicates unavailability of 
data; a these countries are not members of the World Bank, thus their data has been 
sourced from The World Fact Book; data accessed online on 16 March, 2006; b per 
capita GDP for Nauru is for 2001; c data on per capita GDP for Niue is for 2000; d per 
capita GDP data for Tuvalu is for the year 2000; e data on per capita GDP (data for 
2001) and life expectancy for Marshall Islands are taken from The World Fact Book; f 
data for per capita GDP for FSM is for the year 2002 and taken from The World Fact 
Book, h data for per capita GDP for Maldives is for 2002 and from The World Fact 
Book; and, i aid per capita data for Mauritius is for 2002..  Data from The World Fact 
Book is only used when this is not available from The World Development Indicators. 
Source: Unless otherwise stated, the source for all data is The World Development 
Indicators online.  Data accessed on 15 March 2006. 
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Table 2: Rates of growth in GDP and population 
 Aggregate GDP  
growth rates 
Population 
growth rate 
Per capita  
GDP growth 
rate 
COUNTRY 1994-
2004 
1999-
2004 
1999-2004 1999-2004 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Cook Is .. 5.71% 0.97% 4.74%
Fiji 2.86% 3.37% 1.41% 1.95%
Micronesia, 
Fed. Sts. 
-0.05% 1.33% 0.12% 1.22%
Marshall 
Islands 
-0.86% 1.28% 1.98% -0.70%
Kiribati 4.84% 3.03% 2.30% 0.73%
Nauru  -0.05% 1.98% -2.03%
Palau 3.35% 0.67% 1.65% -0.98%
Papua New 
Guinea 
1.03% 1.44% 2.40% -0.96%
Solomon 
Islands 
-0.04% -2.75% 2.94% -5.69%
Samoa 3.04% 3.16% -0.24% 3.39%
Tonga 2.41% 2.78% 1.85% 0.92%
Tuvalu  4.16% 1.41% 2.75%
Vanuatu 1.39% -0.37% 1.68% -2.05%
TOTAL  2.15%
Data source: As listed for table 1 above. 
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Table 3: Demographic indicators for Forum Island Countries (FICs); Australia and 
New Zealand (ANZ); and Maldives, Malta, and Mauritius (3Ms) 
 
 Fertility rate 
(births per 
woman) 
Population 
ages 0-14 
(% of total)
Adult literacy 
rateb 
(% of total) 
Urban population 
(% of total) 
 Y2003 Y2003  Y2003 
Cook Islands .. .. .. .. 
Fiji 2.6 32 92.3 52 
Kiribati 3.6 38 47 
Marshall Islands 3.9a 38a 67 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 3.4 36 29 
Nauru 3.2a 38a .. 
Niue .. .. .. 
Palau 2.5a 26 69 
Papua New Guinea 4.3 41 57.3 13 
Samoa 4.0 35 98.7 22 
Solomon Islands 5.3 45 76.6 17 
Tonga 3.4 34 98.9 34 
Tuvalu 3.0a 31a .. 
Vanuatu 4.3 41 74.0 23 
  
ANZ  
Australia 1.8 20 .. 92 
New Zealand 1.9 22 .. 86 
  
3 Ms  
Malta 1.4 19 87.9 92 
Maldives 4.0 39 97.2 29 
Mauritius 2.0 25 84.3 43 
  
 
Notes: a Data for Fertility rate, Life expectancy, and Population 0 to 14 years are for 
2005, extracted from The World Fact Book, 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ accessed on 16 March 2006.  Data 
is for 2003, the most recent year for which this information is available, and sourced 
from World Bank Development Indicators, unless otherwise stated; b data is 2003 and 
is from the 2005 Human Development Index, published by United Nations at 
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/excel/hdr05_table_1.xls. 
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Table 4: Annual supply-demand imbalance for formal sector employment. 
Country Working age 
population 
(15-24yrs in 2004)
Total formal 
sector 
employmenta
Fresh entrants 
into the 
workforce per 
year 
Fresh entrants as 
a share of 
working age 
population 
 No. 
(Year of data) 
No. 
(% of work-age 
population)  
No. 
(% of total formal 
sector 
employment) 
(%) 
Cook Islands 7,276 
(2001) 
5,900 
(81) 
341 
(6) 
4.7 
Fiji 487,450 
(2003)  
120,000 
(25) 
18,600 
(16) 
3.8 
FSM 61,786 
(2003) 
15,137 
(25) 
3,008 
(20) 
4.8 
Kiribati 54,335 
(2004) 
7,900a 
(15) 
2,537 
(32) 
4.6 
Marshall 
Islands 
29,634 
(2000) 
10,300 
(35) 
1,604 
(16) 
5.4 
PNG 3,320,217 
(2002) 
187,320b 
(6) 
159,618 
(85) 
4.8 
Samoa 91,139 
(2001) 
57,100 
(63) 
5,298 
(9) 
5.8 
Solomon 
Islands 
239,362 
(2002) 
22,177c 
(9) 
13, 320 
(60) 
5.6 
Tonga 51,824 
(2003) 
34,600 
(67) 
2,415 
(7) 
4.7 
Vanuatu 110,976d 
(2004) 
16,300 
(51) 
6,359 
(39) 
5.7 
Work-age population is defined as those in the 15 to 64 year age cohort.  Data for column 3 are 
calculated assuming a uniform distribution of the population of under-14s.  Notes:  a data is for 1996 
the most recent data available from ADB, 2001; b formal sector employment in PNG includes only jobs 
in urban centres; c formal employment in (pre-crisis) Solomon Islands in 1996 was 34,200; and d formal 
sector jobs in Vanuatu includes those in large scale plantations.  Data for Palau and Tuvalu are not 
available.  Source for all data, with the exception noted above, is Booth et al, 2006. 
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Table 5: Perceptions regarding levels of Government-Corruption and Transparency 
Country Commentary from US Department of State Laws giving 
access to 
government 
information to 
media and 
citizenry 
Fiji “Corruption within government, including the civil 
service, was a problem. The media continued to 
raise numerous allegations of nonaccountability, 
bribery, abuse of office, fraud, misuse of public 
property, financial mismanagement, failure to 
complete statutory audits, and conflicts of interest 
regarding officials and ministries. In some 
ministries transparency was virtually nonexistent. 
The constitution gives the auditor general the right 
to audit all national and local government bodies. 
In its annual report to Parliament, the auditor 
general's office highlighted numerous instances of 
corrupt practices in government offices and 
ministries.”  
No 
Kiribati “Nepotism, based on tribal, church, and family ties, 
is prevalent. The auditor general (AG) is 
responsible for oversight of government 
expenditures. However, in reality the AG lacked 
sufficient resources, and findings of 
misappropriations and unaccounted-for funds were 
generally ignored, or the investigations were 
inconclusive.” 
No 
Marshall 
Islands 
“According to the general audit report of 2003, 
performed by an independent accounting firm, 
government corruption was a problem, including 
instances of misuse of public funds and 
irregularities in the collection of certain taxes. The 
attorney general's office is responsible for 
investigating cases of alleged corruption, but only a 
few cases have been prosecuted. In 2003 the 
auditor general and the finance minister were 
replaced and the Finance Ministry reorganized in 
an effort to increase accountability.” 
No 
 
FSM “Government corruption was a problem, 
particularly in Chuuk State. Following the 2004 
convictions of the then speaker of Congress, one 
other member of Congress, and two former 
members on charges relating to misuse of 
government funds, the Attorney General's Office 
investigated and indicted other Chuuk politicians 
for corrupt practices, although one indicted member 
of Congress retained his seat in the March 
No 
(Legislative 
hearings and 
deliberations 
open to the 
public, however) 
 30
elections.” 
Nauru “During the year the government took corrective 
measures in government and in publicly owned 
corporations to combat corruption. Loose controls 
on the enormous revenues generated by phosphate 
mining led to mismanagement and 
misappropriation of vast sums of public funds. 
With the effective end of mining in recent years, 
within a decade the country went from great wealth 
to de facto bankruptcy. A search for new sources of 
income led to the creation of facilities to register 
offshore businesses and banks. This led in turn to 
the creation of thousands of shell banks and 
companies and to massive money laundering. In 
2000 the country was placed on a list of 
noncooperative countries by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
antimoney laundering taskforce and forced to close 
its offshore banking sector and revise its business 
incorporation program. In recognition of its 
corrective actions, in October the OECD removed 
the country from the list. The financial and 
regulatory crises, accompanied by continued 
corruption and severe national impoverishment, 
dominated national politics from the late 1990s. 
The 2004 elections were widely interpreted as a 
victory for reformists dedicated to addressing 
corruption and economic problems.” 
No 
Palau “Government corruption was a problem, which the 
government took some steps to address. The special 
prosecutor has authority to investigate allegations 
of corrupt practices. In June the special prosecutor 
charged the governor of Ngiwal State with grand 
larceny, forgery, and other offenses for allegedly 
diverting at least $25 thousand in state funds to his 
personal use and for other alleged misconduct. The 
case was still pending at year's end. In October 
2004 an employee of the Koror State government 
was charged with cashing for his personal use $30 
thousand in checks intended for the state 
government. During the year the employee entered 
into a plea agreement with the Office of the 
Attorney General to serve two years in jail and pay 
a five thousand dollar fine.” 
Yes 
PNG “Corruption at all levels of government was a 
serious problem, primarily because clan-related 
obligations continued to undermine allegiance to 
constituents or to the country as a whole. … At 
year's end more than 50 government officials were 
under investigation by the ombudsman's office.” 
No 
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Samoa “Government corruption was not widespread, 
although there were some instances of corrupt 
practices involving misuse of public funds. During 
2004 and 2005, charges were brought against 
several current and former employees from the 
Ministry of Health and the Department of Customs 
for theft of government funds, and the chief 
executive officer of the Ministry of Health was 
suspended. At year's end the cases were pending.” 
Yes except for 
privileged 
information. 
Tonga “There were reports of government corruption 
during the year. Officials working in the main port 
reportedly took bribes in exchange for not charging 
the full amount of port and duty tax. In addition the 
Privy Council promulgated certain policies that 
appeared to benefit unfairly businesses associated 
with members of the royal family.” 
No 
Tuvalu “Laws against corruption are weak. There was a 
widespread public perception that the government 
lacked transparency and accountability, that public 
funds sometimes were mismanaged, and that 
government officials benefited unfairly from their 
positions.” 
No 
Vanuatu “Government corruption was a problem. … The 
law provides for the appointment of public servants 
on the basis of merit; however, in practice political 
interference at times has hampered the effective 
operation of the civil service. At year's end several 
officials from the Vanuatu Maritime Authority 
were awaiting trial on charges of criminal 
conspiracy for alleged mishandling of the awarding 
of licenses and contracts.” 
No 
   
Maldives “There were anecdotal reports that the power of the 
president and his family directed many decisions, 
including economic activities and political reform. 
There was an anticorruption board that investigates 
allegations of corruption in the government. The 
board meets regularly and refers cases, usually 
concerning monetary fraud, to the AG's office.” 
No 
Malta “There were no reports of government corruption 
during the year.” 
Yes, but 
government has 
the discretion to 
refuse requests 
for information.   
Mauritius “The public perceived that corruption existed in the 
legislative and executive branches. The ICAC and 
the media were the primary outlets to report acts of 
corruption. The 2002 Prevention of Corruption Act 
regulated such complaints.” 
Yes 
(The law 
provides for 
access to 
government 
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information, and 
the government 
has generally 
complied with 
the requests.) 
Australia “There were no reports of government corruption 
during the year.” 
Yes 
(FOIa). 
New 
Zealand 
“There were no reports of government corruption 
during the year.” 
Yesb
 
Source: 2005 Country Report on Human Right Practices, US Department of State, 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour (released online at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/c17093.htm on March 8, 2006). Notes: a The 
federal, state, and territorial governments have freedom of information (FOI) laws.  
These laws provide the public with access to government information, subject to an 
application and a processing fee; b the New Zealand law provides for public access to 
government information. This is legislated to be provided within 20 working days of a 
request and the information must be made available unless a good reason exists for 
not doing so. The requester must be provided with an estimate of any fees before the 
information is provided. 
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Figure 1: Per capita GDP in constant USD over time for Fiji and Mauritius  
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Figure 2: Per-capita GDP with current rates of growth continuing, 2004 and 2020. 
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Figure 3: 
 
Government Effectiveness- 2004
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(Chosen comparator also shown for selected countries)
Note: Blue dots represent estimates for 
the 2004 governance indicators. The thin 
vertical lines represent standard errors 
around these estimates for each country 
in world-wide sample. Black dot 
represents the chosen year comparator 
(if any). To add or delete countries from 
the chart, click on the "Country 
Selection" tab below.
Source:  "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 " by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi,  2005.  
Disclaimer:  The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official position of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to 
margins of error that are clearly indicated. Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data.
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Figure 4: 
 
Rule of Law - 2004
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(Chosen comparator also shown for selected countries)
Note: Blue dots represent estimates for 
the 2004 governance indicators. The thin 
vertical lines represent standard errors 
around these estimates for each country 
in world-wide sample. Black dot 
represents the chosen year comparator 
(if any). To add or delete countries from 
the chart, click on the "Country 
Selection" tab below.
Source:  "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 " by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi,  2005.  
Disclaimer:  The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official position of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to 
margins of error that are clearly indicated. Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data.
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Figure 5: 
 
 Control of Corruption - 2004
SO
LO
M
O
N
 IS
LA
N
D
S
PA
PU
A
 N
EW
 G
U
IN
EA
M
A
R
SH
A
LL
 IS
LA
N
D
S
TU
VA
LU
TO
N
G
A
VA
N
U
A
TU
M
IC
R
O
N
ES
IA
C
O
O
K
 IS
LA
N
D
S
FI
JI K
IR
IB
A
TI
SA
M
O
A
M
A
LD
IV
ES
M
A
U
R
IT
IU
S
M
A
LT
A
A
U
ST
R
A
LI
A
N
EW
 Z
EA
LA
N
D
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
204 Countries
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 C
on
tr
ol
 o
f C
or
ru
pt
io
n 
In
de
x
HIGH
LOW
Note: Blue dots represent estimates for 
the 2004 governance indicators. The thin 
vertical lines represent standard errors 
around these estimates for each country 
in world-wide sample. Black dot 
represents the chosen year comparator 
(if any). To add or delete countries from 
the chart, click on the "Country 
Selection" tab below.
(Chosen comparator also shown for selected countries)
Source:  "Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 " by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi,  2005.  
Disclaimer:  The governance indicators presented here reflect the statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of 
enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, and international organizations. The aggregate indicators in no way reflect the official position of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent. As discussed in detail in the accompanying papers, countries' relative positions on these indicators are subject to 
margins of error that are clearly indicated. Consequently, precise country rankings should not be inferred from this data.
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Table A1: Poverty levels within Pacific Developing Member Countries of the ADB 
  
 
  Population in Poverty (%) 
(National Poverty Line)  a  
Proportion of 
Population Below $1 
DMC Total  Urban   Rural     (PPP) a Day (%) 
       
Cook Islands ...  ...  ...    ...   
Fiji Islands 25.5 g 27.6 g 22.4 g (1990)  25.0  (1990) 
Kiribati 51.0 h ...  ...  (1996)  38.0  (1996) 
Marshall Islands ...  ...  ...    20.0  (1999) 
Micronesia, Fed. 
States of 
27.9  ...  ...  (1998)  5.2  (1998) 
Nauru ...  ...  ...    ...   
Palau ...  ...  ...    ...   
Papua New 
Guinea 
37.5  16.1  41.3  (1996)  24.6  (1996) 
Samoa   20.3 h ...  ...  (2002)  5.5  (2002) 
Solomon Islands ...  ...  ...    ...   
Tonga  22.7 h ...  ...  (2001)  4.0  (2001) 
Tuvalu  29.3 h ...  ...  (1994)  17.2  (1994) 
Vanuatu  ...  ...  ...    26.0  (1998) 
Source: Table 1. Poverty, Inequality, and Human Development, Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) - Key Indicators 2005 (www.adb.org/statistics) 
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